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Up to the middle of the 1980, Hungary gave refugees to the world; but from 
1987, the country itself has also been admitting refugees. Between 1988 and 
1995, more than 130,000 refugees were registered in the country. The number 
of those who arrived in Hungary and looked for the support of private persons, 
not registering themselves at the authorities can be much more. Among the 
reasons arising in the Hungarian-Romanian relationship, the first place was oc-
cupied by violent urbanization, the organized destruction of villages in Roma-
nia that began in 1987. Furthermore, the practice of Ceausescu’s dictatorship 
violating human rights also played a serious role, paired with the discrimination 
against Hungarian, German and Jewish minorities. The increasing number of 
social and economic problems is also one of the important factors of migration 
motives. The immigration of Romanian citizens demanded measures of bor-
der control, administrational control, state security and public safety from the 
part of the Hungarian law enforcement bodies, while the negotiations between 
the “allied parties” was also needed as much as diplomatic and international 
political solutions. During the examination of the complex problems of the 
migration process, the present research intends to turn the attention towards 
three characteristic motions, based on the contemporary documents: the secret 
service and political means of the realization of the Romanian urbanization 
program, the “events” occurring along Hungarian-Romanian borders, and the 
differences between the techniques of treating refugee affairs.
Key words: border control operations, collapse of communism, ethnic 
problems, Helsinki Final Agreement, illegal border crossings, mass migra-
tion, refugee affairs, Romanian-Hungarian tensions, state security services, 
system changein communist Europe, territorial demands, Warsaw Treaty 
Organization.
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At issue is the identification and analysis of the “refugee problem” 
in the context of Romanian-Hungarian relations of 1987-89. The 
task is daunting due to the complex web of events and communica-
tion flows – bilateral, multilateral and, in some respects, global – that 
had a direct or indirect bearing on the matter at hand. From 1987 on, 
the waves of refugees arriving from Romania tended to obscure oth-
er dimensions of conflict between the two states and the two ruling 
Communist parties. As it happened, not only ethnic Hungarians, but 
citizens of other countries, some from the Communist bloc, and some 
from the Third World, increasingly targeted Hungary as a destination 
country. The arrival of such migrants gave an advantage to the Hun-
garian leadership by endowing the regime with the image of being 
the positive alternative of a “reforming socialist” country to the West. 
The following discussion seeks to examine the factors that motivated, 
and, in turn, influenced, the mass migration of Romanian citizens, (pre-
dominantly ethnic Hungarians from Transylvania) in the late 1980’s. The 
case is summed up in unambiguous terms by a Hungarian governmental 
interagency position paper. “In the past few years, mainly due to the dis-
criminating measures against citizens of Hungarian nationality, the low-
er living standards, the number of legal and illegal migrants, the majority 
of whom are ethnic Hungarians arriving in Hungary is increasing, and 
they have no intention of returning to the Socialist Republic of Romania”.2 
Prior to the mid-1980s, it was  Hungary which gave refugees to the 
world; but from 1987 on, the country became a destination for refugees 
from near and far. Between 1988 and 1995, more than 130,000 refu-
gees were registered in the country. The number of those who arrived 
in Hungary receiving support from private persons, mainly relatives, 
without registering with the authorities, may be substantially higher. 
The main reason for this exodus was the Romanian regime’s policies 
so-called regional and settlement reorganization - in Romanian official 
language – “systematization,” in colloquial Hungarian “village destruc-
tion,” that began in  1987. Furthermore, the  Ceauşescu’s dictatorship’s 
violation of human rights also played a significant role, and was part 
and parcel of additional discriminatory measures against Hungarian, 
German and Jewish minorities. Social and economic problems were 
2 The Inter-ministerial State Committee dealing with the affairs of foreign citizens re-
siding in Hungary informs the county and town committee secretaries about their 
tasks connected to the solution of the situation of foreign, mainly Romanian citizens of 
Hungarian nationality residing in Hungary and not intending to return home. 14th April 
1988. NAH HSWP CC PAD M-KS 288. f. 31/21. (hereafter: NAH: National Archives 
of Hungary HSWP: Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party; CC: Central Committee; PAD: 
Public Administrative Department)
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also important migration factors. The immigration of Romanian citi-
zens necessitated enhanced measures of border control, and related 
administrative procedures. Much of this posed new challenges to Hun-
garian agencies of state security and public safety. The issue also called 
for an intensification of negotiations between and among the “fraternal 
socialist parties” of the Soviet bloc. The object of the exercise was the 
moving of this unprecedented phenomenon toward established and 
hitherto workable socialist interstate diplomatic and political consul-
tative channels. With the principal focus on the complex problem of 
migration, and the utilization of contemporary documentary evidence, 
the following discussion seeks to address three related issues. These are 
the instruments of the Romanian policy, particularly the use of state’s 
internal security organs for the implementation of the regime’s policies 
of “systematization”, the story and subsequent resolution of “incidents” 
along the Hungarian-Romanian border, and the differences in the 
two regimes’ management of the evolving refugee crisis of 1987-1989. 
Political and Security Background 
Large migrations are first and foremost examined by national secu-
rity researchers as a challenge to security, one of the factors that may 
endanger public safety (Deák 2007: 17). The free movement of people 
between countries has been a natural phenomenon since the fall of the 
“iron curtain,” and migration affects security. Mass migration may also 
burden the social and economic capacity and infrastructure of a given 
country. In addition, it may foster the underground economy, money 
laundering and organised crime, or it may open channels to radical-
ism, extremism and political violence. However, beyond these security 
considerations, it is also worth examining the political and economic 
dimensions of migration.
In Hungary, just as in  Soviet-dominated Eastern Europe, after 
1947-48 the issue of legal and illegal migration was fundamentally 
considered a state security concern. In an era attentive to class strug-
gle, the ideological argument was quite simple: those inclined to leave 
the people’s democracy could be only (political) criminals, but most 
people arriving were considered likely spies.3 It was also characteristic 
that the Hungarian Bureau of Immigrant and Emigrants’ Protection,4 
originally created in 1921, continued dealing with the affairs of immi-
3 Our democratic police is five years old. Hungarian Policeman. 15th January 1950, p. 4 .




grants after 1945. However the Bureau ceased operations on June 15 
1948 5, although formally minor issues were dealt with by the World 
Association of Hungarians.6 It is not accidental, that based on the reso-
lution number 4353/1949/268./M.T. of the Council of Ministers of the 
People’s Republic of Hungary, the Border Police were transferred from 
the Ministry of Defense to the jurisdiction of the State Security Agency 
– the notorious political police, better known by its Hungarian acro-
nym, the ÁVH.7 Furthermore, the command structure of the Border 
Guards was merged, as one department, under the aegis of the AVH.8 
In this period, a system of total border control was established along 
the southern (Yugoslav) and western (Austrian) border areas.9 With 
reference to restrictions on travel abroad, no data was found on any 
permits issued to emigrate from Hungary between 1949 and 1953.10 
According to official political doctrine in a people’s democracy there 
were no legitimate  reasons for emigration (See Szántó 1984); therefore, 
emigration was not, and could not have been, a concern. As for foreign 
individuals coming to Hungary, state security had to be particularly 
vigilant against those few who were deemed to be “war-mongering, 
counter-revolution-plotting imperialists”. Those who tried to cross the 
border illegally, “defying the scrutiny of border security” (Kádár  1953: 
87), were in serious danger. Following the patterns of the Soviet penal 
code, nearly to the letter, other Eastern-European countries also regu-
lated border-related transgressions.11 
5 463.231/1948. Directive of the Ministry of the Interior. 
6 Jenes. M.: The Bureau Defending Hungarian Emigrants and Re-migrants. 1945-1948. 
NAH XIX-B-7.
7 255.100/Presidential Depertment (hereafter: Pres.) Directive of the Leader of State 
Security Agency (hereafter: SSA) in 30th December 1949. Central Archives of the 
Ministry of the Interior (hereafter: CAMI). Collection of Directives (hereafter CD) 1949. 
box 12 (hereafter b.) 
8  Boreczky, Beatrix: The organisation of the SSA, 1950-1953. Safe. 1.Historical Office, Bp., 
1999, p. 99.
9 In 1950, then in 1952, along the western borderlines a 15 km-long borderline area, and 
within it, 500 and 50 m-wide borderlines were established where one could enter only 
with the permission of the police or the border guard service. Only border guards could 
enter 50-m borderlines. Along the western borderlines, a square system of barbed wire 
was established. In the South and in the West, a 318 km-long minefield was built. The 
minefield was removed along the southern borderlines in 1956, but it was resettled in 
the West in 1957. The minefields were ceased in 1965 in the southern, and in 1969 in the 
western borderline area. The removal of the minefields was finished in 1971 (See also: 
Csapodi 2002 and Okváth 1988).
10 In 1953, 153 persons were permitted to emigrate. (Tóth 2001: 35) 
11  See Penal Code: Official Text. Edited by the Panel of the Ministry of Justice and Public 
Prosecutor’s Office of the Socialistic Republic of Romania. Scholarly Publishing House, 
Bucharest, 1956. section 320-322. 
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Keeping with the demands of in-depth prevention, the operational 
field of the border guard service was a 15-km-wide swath from the 
border. Within that area, the border guards   always to be in service to 
detect illegal border crossings, with instructions to arrest illegal border 
crossers and hand them over to the police.12 The operational tasks were 
performed by reconnaissance units. Their assignment was to detect in-
dividuals who may endanger border security. This was to be done by 
covert and open means such as social interaction and cooperation with 
the civilian population. Usually, border control regulations were car-
ried out without taking into account the particular political character 
of the neighbouring countries. The border control network, however, 
distinguished between the “Western relationship” and the “southern 
and fraternal border relationship.” In the latter case, the border guard 
agency dealt mainly with illegal border crossers coming in and related 
to tourism, and those who wanted to leave the country illegally. The 
agency also performed cross-border assignments and exploratory mis-
sions – mainly in the western areas. For more effective cooperation the 
border guard units and the regional state security operatives prepared 
an annual joint plan of action.13     
The establishment of the system of total border control (and the 
penal regulations for it) certainly did not completely prevent, though 
significantly hindered those who wanted to cross the borders illegally. 
For political reasons, after 1949 many Greek, and after 1973, many 
Chilean sought refuge in Hungary. However, apart from these western 
leftist self-exiles, it has been Hungary that gave refugees to the world 
for more than fifty years. As for legal and illegal migration, there are no 
exact data after 1945.14 Based on various sources, we can estimate that 
approximately 100,000 people migrated from Hungary in the period 
between 1945 and 1956, (mainly between 1944 and 1945) but the num-
ber of people legally emigrating did not reach 15,000. After the wave of 
migration of  about 170,000 in 1956-57, the number of legal emigrants 
was about 1500-2400, while the number of illegal migrants fluctuated 
between 300 and 500 before the 1960s.15 From the 1960’s to the 1980’s 
12 Border Control Regulations. Ministry of the Interior. Order number 7. 20th February 
1958. CAMI CD 1958. 
13 The assignments of the exploratory bodies of the Border Guards of the Ministry of the 
Interior. Order number 014. CAMI CD 1969. no. 10-21/14/69.
14 It is only a partial explanation that the documents of the SSA from between 1951-1953 do 
not reach two metres documents in the Historical Archives of the State Security Agency 
(See: Baráth 2008: 131)..
15 People who committed the crime of „escaping abroad” were not accused of a crime 
against the state, but for a political crime, based on the Penal Code passed in 1961. These 




more people left the country than those who migrated to Hungary, 
1000 to 2000 people immigrated (Harcsa 1997: 221). Illegal migration 
was very low until the 1980’s. Between 1960 and 1987, the number of 
illegal border crossings did not reach 500 in any year,16 but the number 
of illegal border crossers coming from Romania did not reach 10,000 
persons per year until 1987.17 
Since the mid-1980s, the situation changed. While the number of 
emigrants quickly decreased, the number of foreign citizens entering 
Hungary legally or illegally (mainly from Romania, but not exclusively 
ethnic Hungarians) and intending to settle down increased quickly. 
The years of 1987-88 witnessed a sharp reversal of migration patterns 
since the end of World War II. In 1987, compared to the number of 
immigrants, the numbers of legal (1,476) and illegal (4,923) emigrants 
showed a population decrease of 4,000. In 1988, however, the popu-
lation showed a net increase of 8,000 people (12,788 immigrants vs. 
4,864 emigrants). From this period, the difference in migration did not 
show negative ratios in any period. (Tóth  1997: 65) It is a noteworthy 
circumstance that the number of illegal border crossings in the “eastern 
border” area already approached 7,000 (6,854), and, except one, all the 
border violators were detained.18
Special attention gained by the migration phenomenon popularly 
known as “Romanian refugees” could be explained by the complexity 
of the issue. Disputes between two communist states belonging to the 
same alliance system became increasingly tense and became acrimoni-
ous when the two leaderships’ policy postures escalated beyond previ-
ously shared positions regarding ideology, inter-party and international 
relations.
In the 1980 and, in some respects well before that, the two regimes 
had been at loggerheads about many policy issues. These hitherto semi-
latent conflicts came to the surface when each regime sought to legiti-
a crime against the public order and safety included in chapter 12. See: The number of 
crimes committed against the sate and of political nature, the reasons for the crimes based 
on the experienced of the past 14 years. Ministry of the Interior Department III/1. 3rd 
March 1974. 16 p. in CAMI CD no. 1974. 34-67/74. 
16 Report about the results of border control. The Proposal of the Minister of the Interior to 
the Political Committee of the HSWP about the long-run assigments of border control. 
3rd February 1989. Suppliment number 3. MOL M-KS 288. f. 5/1054. 
17  The number of Romanians migrating to Hungary in a yearly compilation. István Horváth: 
The migration of the Hungarian minority in Romania to Hungary. Korunk. February 
2002. Chart number 8. 
18 Report about the results of border control. The Proposal of the Minister of the Interior to 
the Political Committee of the HSWP about the long-run assignments of border control. 
3rd February 1989. Supplement number 3. 
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mate its rule by resorting to sharply different policy. Kadar opted for 
soft dictatorship and consumerism, Ceausescu chose national chauvin-
ism, de facto ethnic cleansing of Hungarian-populated Transylvania 
and an economy of scarcities. These incompatible postures were rap-
idly exacerbated by the ethnic Hungarians’ attempted exodus from Ro-
mania. The bilateral dispute soon acquired international dimensions. 
With the help of the regime-controlled media, each side sought to jus-
tify its domestic agenda – both to their domestic constituencies and to 
the international community. Both sides sought to elicit international 
support for their cause. In this situation, a variety of data, motives and 
interpretations of their decisions, were published with reference to the 
groups of people migrating from Romania to Hungary.
The fundamental equation is straightforward: “people always tend to 
escape from tyranny to freedom.” As an expert observer explained, the 
common thread of the reason for migration is coercion or pressure to 
leave. These include “political persecution, ethnic or racial discrimina-
tion, disasters, wars and military conflicts, and finally unemployment, 
or social and economic problems” (Tóth 1991: 112). As for Romania, it 
would be misleading to treat political motives as the sole reason for that 
regime’s conduct. It is true that refugees escaping from Romania main-
ly complained of “lack of democracy, terror, ever-present spy network, 
and ethnic discrimination  by way of coercive  “urbanisation” and the 
dismantling of small rural communities (Kende 1989: 95-96). How-
ever, contrary to the official propaganda, it was a fact of life in Romania, 
that the majority of the population, compared to the European average, 
as well as to the Hungarian standards of living, lived in poor and ev-
er-worsening conditions.19 As shown below, our discussion will focus 
mainly on the political motives of the refugees, because these    played a 
decisive role in motivating the migration of Romanian citizens, but also 
in the measures taken by Hungary and her domestic agencies, as well as 
in the receptivity of the refugees by Hungarian public opinion. 
Next to questions related to the legitimacy of the Kadar regime, the 
nationality question, that is, the issue of the ethnic Hungarians across 
Hungary’s borders, was a forbidden topic. The issue was made taboo 
by the web of of the regime’s commitments to the internationalist and 
“fraternal” socialist (communist) parties of the Soviet bloc. From this 
it follows that the interpretation of problems presented by the presence 
19 We may as well call the case of a twenty-year-old couple tragic-comical. They left their 
six-months-old baby in Romania and justified their escape with the fact that “there is 
video in Hungary”. Forró, Tamás and Havas, Henrik’s interview with captain Pénzes, 
Margit the acting director of the Division of Administration of Hajdú-Bihar county 




of the Hungarian minority was the regime’s prerogative. Therefore, an 
open discussion of these issues was relegated to the politically illegal 
opposition. It also gave voice and an agenda to Hungarian émigrés of 
the west, as well as to the Hungarian-language media published and 
broadcast abroad.
The meetings of editors-in-chief of the Agitation and Propaganda 
Department of the Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party (HSWP) served 
as additional control mechanism of the party over the press (Hegedűs 
2001; Pór 2004). Such monthly meetings sought to identify anticipated 
events suitable for publication, as well an analysis of the media’s output 
to date. Pursuant to the regime’s agenda on the “nationality question,” 
the party leadership suspended in 1978 all “problematic writings” relat-
ed to Transylvania, as well as strengthened the “effectively functioning” 
of  “ex-post censorship”. It “provisionally” mandated that writings deal-
ing with Hungarians abroad could only be published after consulting 
with the Central Committee’s Department of Agitation and Propagan-
da. However, more important than these measures were the interpreta-
tion of the set of  guiding principles for the press:20
Regardless of location in the world, only socialism can solve the  -
problem of nationalities; there is no other solution.
The fundamental precondition to resolve the nationality question is  -
that there should be good relations between peoples and countries. 
Read: tensions between Hungarians and Romanians only harm the 
situation of Hungarians living in  Romania. 
We must treat the issue in a way that would not harm our cause  -
(danger of isolation) and would not harm Hungarians living outside 
the borders.
The ethnic issue is not a territorial issue for us. -
Hostile, fascist émigré groups now especially agitating on behalf  -
of  Hungarians in Romania are our enemies, as they are enemies 
of the Socialist Republic of Romania and the Hungarians living in 
Romania.
In sum, we care about the fate of Hungarians abroad according to  -
principles of internationalism. 
In the same year the same issue came up, with a similar level of 
secrecy, but with a radically different interpretation. At that time, the 
Department of Intelligence (III/I-1.) of the Ministry of the Interior 
was tasked with intelligence operations against the United States and 
international organizations. Evidence of the success in obtaining 
information needed for domestic consumption in Hungary was the 
20 NAH M–KS 288. f. 22178/25.
15
acquisition of a NATO internal document. On 18th April 1978, the 
British delegation prepared a memorandum about the situation of 
the Hungarian minority in Romania for the session of the Political 
Committee of the NATO.21 Slightly two months later, the Minister of 
the Interior sent the translation of the memorandum to János Kádár 
and to the five members of the  party’s Politburo. The summary is a 
follows:
The Hungarian ethnic minority – that lives mainly in Transylvania  -
– is one of the largest ethnic minorities in Europe. According to 
Romanian census data, there are 1,7 million Hungarians of the 
total population of 21,5 million. According to Hungarian émigré 
sources, the number of Hungarians living in Romania is estimated 
at 2,5 or possibly 3 million. 
Transylvania has  historical importance for both Romania and  -
Hungary. For the Romanians, it means the homeland of their 
ancestors who lived there since antiquity. Hungarians had ruled 
Erdély directly or indirectly since the 13th century. From 1867 to the 
First World War, the Romanians suffered much from  Hungarian 
nationalism and forcible attempts to assimilate. The Romanians – 
considering the invasion of northern Transylvania by Hungarians 
in the Second World War by virtue of the Second Vienna Award of 
August 1940 - are probably afraid that the Hungarians once again 
will demand teh retrun of Transylvania. 
At the end of the 1950’s, the old Hungarian university in Cluj  -
Napoca was integrated into the Romanian university system as 
part of coercion against the Hungarian ethnic minority; and this 
coercion has been implemented partly or totally ever since. Probably 
encouraged by other anti-regime movements elsewhere in Eastern 
Europe, some members of the Hungarian minority initiated an 
open protest movement in recent years. The first manifestation of 
this protest – to which the west paid attention – was the so-called 
“Lazarus Document” allegedly written by a Hungarian person living 
in Transylvania under a pseudonym.22 This document contains 
a report about the past of the Hungarians in Transylvania, about 
21 The situation of the Hungarian minority in Romania: further vicissitudes. (A magyar 
kisebbség helyzete Romániában: újabb megpróbáltatások.) Report of Benkei, András 
about the NATO-report, 1st July 1978. CAMI Files of Interior 1978/ 96. 1-a-776.
22 In the March-April issue of the Paris Literary Journal the study entitled Report about 
Transylvania (Jelentés Erdélyről) is published, written by Tóth, Sándor professor of 
Philosophy in Cluj Napoca and Budapest philosopher Tordai, Zádor under the pseudonym 
Lázár, György. The Western media turns attention to the report. For example, the issue of 
the Le Monde published on 5th May 1978 explains it, and then the report of Schöpflin, 
György is written based on this report, published by Minority Rights Group. The 
Witnesses to Cultural Genocide was published in 1979 in the volume entitled Romania’s 




their participation in the fight for Romanian socialism between 
the two world wars and describes their present situation. Although 
it is very probable that the document was written before 1976, 
it was published in the West only in March 1977. An intellectual 
group consisting of mainly Transylvanian Hungarians somehow 
managed to obtain this document; therefore, it also became known 
in Hungary before the meeting of Kádár and Ceauşescu in June 
1977 near the Romanian-Hungarian border […]23
The Hungarians are critical the “Romanization” policies in education,  -
because they are afraid that this phenomenon will not only decrease 
the number of educated Hungarian in positions requiring a high 
level of academic preparation to a minimal number, but it also 
endangers the characteristic Hungarian culture in Transylvania. 
The ethnic policy of President Ceauşescu is the product of Romanian 
nationalism that is the gist of both his external policy and internal 
policy aiming to create a strong nation state. Ceauşescu, in his speech 
addressed to the Commission of Hungarian-speaking Workers on 
15th March said that ethnic problems must be examined based on 
class aspects, and “if discriminations occurred in Romania, then 
they did not occur based on national, but on class interests”. 
Kádár also spoke about the solution of ethnic problems with  -
socialist solutions. In an interview published in the Frankfurter 
Rundschau the previous year Kádár declared: “In the 20th century, 
an ethnic problem cannot be solved by 19th century standards. 
The fate of the minority cannot be separated from the fate of the 
majority. The ethnic issue is one of the issues that will gain their final 
solution in socialism, based on the fact that socialism provides free 
development for the whole society, including the minorities within. 
In today’s Europe, the fate of nations and ethnic minorities cannot 
be solved by recalling past glories, only by the correct application 
of the lessons of history.” This last sentence can be interpreted as 
a warning to Hungarians living in Hungary, or as criticism to the 
Romanians, or both. Kádár, while he is probably anxious about the 
fate of the Hungarians in Transylvania, has to operate carefully, if 
Transylvanian Federation Inc. and the Committee for Human Rights in Rumania, with 
the foreword of Schöpflin, György. (See also: Tóth 1989: 5-16.) 
23 The document was later forwarded – with current information – to Király, Károly, the 
former member of the CC of RCP and the Romanian Parliament. It deals with the letters 
of the Vice President of The Committee of Romanian Workers of Hungarian Nationality 
written to leading Romanian personalities, in which Király, Károly expresses his deep 
anxiety about the violent assimilation attempts of the Romanian Government against 
Hungarians. Király was obliged to move from Tirgu Mures, a town populated by Hungarian 
majority to Caransebes where he was assigned to be the director of a furniture factory. See 
the whole text: Révész, Béla: A NATO-document about the situation of the Hungarian 
minority in Romania (NATO dokumentum a romániai magyar kisebbség helyzetéről). 
ArchívNet 2005. http://www.archivnet.hu/old/rovat/cikk.phtml?cikk_kod=109
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he does not want to see the revival of nationalism and irredentism 
in Hungary.  
Kádár – according to the declaration – during his meeting with  -
Ceauşescu last year agreed that for both countries the right solution 
of minority issues lies in building socialism; at the same time, he 
admitted that the solution of the problem are an internal affair of 
each country. During the meeting an agreement was reached on 
opening the border for local traffic and about the establishment of 
a Consulate in Cluj Napoca a long time wish of local Hungarians 
and about the establishment of a Romanian Consulate in the 
Hungarian city of Debrecen. Despite this, concerns in Hungary 
about the fate of Hungarians living in Transylvania did not subside. 
Gyula Illyés, the well-known Hungarian writer published articles 
in the December and January issues of the Hungarian daily Magyar 
Nemzet expressing concern for the increasing oppression of the 
Hungarian minority in Romania. When Stefan Andrei, secretary 
of foreign affairs of the Party visited Hungary, the issue was 
obviously discussed, but judging from the brief statements issued 
and published on the press of both countries, no visible progress 
was made on the matter.
While it is not probable that Kádár would encourage the re- -
emergence of Hungarian territorial demands for Transylvania, the 
Romanian failure to improve their  treatment of the Hungarian 
minority will most likely not satisfy Budapest’s expectations, leading 
to continued or even increased tensions between the two countries. 
The assumption is that it is not in the interest of the Soviet Union for 
the situation to worsen but it may be tempted to apply some degree 
of pressure on Romania in response to the Hungarian minority 
concerns.
The NATO report reflects the British Intelligence’s concise summa-
ry of the background of the historic ethnic conflict between Hungary 
and Romania, focusing on the current problems, that is, those of the 
1970’s forwarding the information to the NATO Council, one of the 
most significant deliberative bodies of the organization. A very impor-
tant approach of the report is that it made a connection between the 
increasing protests on behalf of the Hungarian minority and the op-
position movements in Eastern Europe. Using material from legal and 
undercoverl sources of intelligence, the report was able to document 
the tensions between the two countries, it also offered dubious solu-
tions to end the controversy, using official documents and unofficial or 
informal hearsay material. A common feature of the above mentioned 
documents is the article written by noted Hungarian writer Gyula Illyes 
published in the Christmas 1977 issue of Magyar Nemzet. In fact, while 




the NATO report makes reference to the “very strong article” by the 
“highly respected Hungarian writer”. There are no data about the fate of 
the NATO report. János Kádár read the document without comment-
ing on it. In the next decade, its most significant findings became in-
creasingly valid.  
Urbanization, Village Destruction: Motives, Opportunity, Pretext
After the publication of the three-volume History of Transylvania24 
in 1986, edited by a leading party ideologue, the already tense Hun-
garian-Romanian relationship was further burdened by ideological 
conflicts. The Romanian government did its best to make people and 
the international public opinion believe that the history book contained 
“Fascist, chauvinistic and racist statements” and “forgeries of history 
that harm the memory of the victims of the Horthyist terror”.25 In their 
campaign, “the nationwide plenary sessions of the Committee of Hun-
garian-speaking Workers” was also enrolled in the effort. On 27th Feb-
ruary 1987, a new session Commission of Ethnic Affairs was organised 
and even non-experts criticized the History of Transylvania without 
reading it and made their statements on prepared texts. Ceauşescu 
argued for the theory of Daco-Romanian continuity, spoke about the 
Hungarian-Romanian cooperation against the Turks and declared that 
the ethnic issues had already been solved in Romania. He commented 
on the book that “it was a forgery of history” that was thwarting coop-
eration between two socialist countries. 26
24 Erdély története I-III (History of Transylvania I-III.). [edited by Köpeczi, Béla]. Akadémiai, 
Budapest, 1986.
25 On 7th April 1987, the Times published an advertisement that with the publication of the 
book, “under the aegis of the Hungarian academy of Sciences, history has been forged”. 
Under the same title, another text were published in English written by academici-
ans St. Pascu, M. Musat and Fl. Constantinu (A Consciensious Forgery of History 
of Transylvania under the Aegis of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences Romanian 
News Agency.), enumerating the opinions of Romanian historians about the Dacian-
Romanian Continuity, the independent Province of Transylvania, the national effort of 
Duke Michael, the rightfulness of the Romanian revolution in 1848-49, the Hungarian 
oppression in the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, citing Marx, Lenin, Tolstoy and Björnson. 
The Trianon Treaty of Peace was evaluated as the resolution of the Romanian population 
of Transylvania, in North Transylvania, the oppression of the Hungarians between 1940 
and 1944 and the deportation of Jews were emphasised, and finally it was declared that 
ethnic issues were already solved in Romania. The edition was considered “revisionist, 




But the anger fuelled by the Romanian political leadership was only 
an element of increasingly vocal national homogenisation efforts. At 
the 10th Congress of the Romanian Communist party, the Secretary 
General highlighted the changing role of the state: “No doubt that after 
the elimination of the exploiting classes, in harmony the developing 
homogenization of the socialist society, the role of the state and the 
instruments it employs also changes.27 When making reference to the 
nationalities of Romania and until the mid-eighties, Ceauşescu made 
specific references to “all of the workers – Romanians, Hungarians, 
Germans and other nationalities”, but this expression was replaced by 
“all of the workers without any differences, our whole people”, “all citi-
zens of our homeland” and “nationalities living together” at the session 
of the Committees of Hungarian and German Workers at the end of 
1984.28 
However, the process of cultural homogenisation had begun much 
earlier (Süle, 1990: 265-269; Lipcsey 1989: 64-66; Tóth 1989: 124-133). 
In the first quarter of 1985, broadacting by the ethnic district stations of 
the Romanian Radio were discontinued in Cluj Napoca, Targu Mures 
and Timisoara and the editorial staff and their nearly 600 employees 
were dismissed. The Hungarian language TV channels had a similar 
fate. From 1986, the material of the museums in Transylvania was 
transferred to Bucharest29, and Hungarian books became unavailable 
for the readers in the libraries.30 Bilingual inscriptions and street names 
disappeared in Transylvania, and the majority of streets of Hungarian 
27 N. Ceauşescu: The Report of the Central Committee of the Romanian Communist Party 
about the activities of RCP from the period between Congress 9 and 10 about the future 
tasks of the Party. 6th August 1969. In: Romania on the way of building a many-sided 
developed socialistic society. Politics, Bucharest, 197, p. 297 
28 See: A Magyar Nemzetiségű Dolgozók Tanácsának feladatairól a XIII. pártkongresszus 
i határozatok fényében (In the light of the Resolutions of the Party Congress 13 about 
the tasks of the Committee of Romanian Workers of Hungarian Nationality. Onwards 
(Előre), 29th December 1989. 
29 “Connected to the preparation of the party meeting, the first room of the Museum of 
Local History in Cernat where the most ancient monuments of local history were 
exhibited was evacuated and was filled with the material presenting the periods of the 
Dacians to present day and the Ceausescu-era, based on the guidelines of the County 
Museum. However, on the county level it was considered so important that the Secretariat 
of Propaganda Affairs ordered the leader of the Securitate to check it in person on 
Saturday, 7th November.” Report of the Hungarian Embassy, Bucharest, 10 November 
1989. Declassified documents of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1989. NAH XIX-J-1-j. 
76. b.
30 “The distribution of all Hungarian press products was suspended throughout Romania 
for 1990. The chances of press subscriptions were very narrow even this year, but until 
1989 it was allowed to subscribe for Hungarian press products not containing political 




towns were renamed in Romanian. The number of books published in 
Hungarian decreased to 50 percent in 10 years; in 1972 265 books were 
published in Hungarian, but only 225 in 1980, and in 1987 less than 
200. Only 2 million books of the 50 million copies published in 1981 
were Hungarian, but based on the ethnic-linguistic ratios, this number 
should have been around 4 million. After the Second World War, there 
were six independent Hungarian theatres in Romania – more in 1956, 
when four companies operated only in Cluj Napoca – up to the 1980’s, 
when only two theatres remained: one in Cluj and one in Timisoara. 
The two large theatres of Transylvania were integrated into Roma-
nian theatre companies: in Targu Mures and Sfântu Gheorghe. From 
the end of the 1970s, the number of Hungarian primary and secondary 
schools decreased to 25 percent. Based on the earlier Act of Education, 
15 students were sufficient to create an “ethnic class,” but until the begin-
ning of the 1980s the students could learn in Hungarian primary school 
with 25 students and in secondary schools with 36 students. While in 
the school year 1977-78 the number of Hungarian primary school stu-
dents was 7-8 percent, in 1986-87 this ratio was only 5 percent. 
The practice introduced in 1956 according to which one could take 
an entrance exam in Hungarian at any university of the country, and in 
case of students a Hungarian group, could be established, was ended. 
In the Department of Hungarian Studies of Babes-Bolyai University 32 
instructors taught in the school year 1964-65, but only 14 in 1988. In 
the school year 1986-87 7 students got a degree of Hungarian studies, 
but since it was the state that gave jobs to graduating teachers, engineers 
and doctors, fewer and fewer of them got a job in the areas of Transyl-
products makes it impossible that even a letter written in Hungarian should be allowed in 
Romania.” Report of the Hungarian Embassy, Bucharest, 7th December 1988. 
 In the recent weeks, Chlef Bogdán, teacher of Romanian and French language was 
nominated as the director of the “closed library” of Sfantu Gheorghe, 54 years old (his 
wife is Hungarian) who is renowned for his hatred for Hungarians. The town propaganda 
secretary is Chlef ’s best friend. The new library director was assigned to annihilate 
everything in the library and in the Székely Museum that is Hungarian as soon as possible. 
The ambition of the director leaves no doubt about that he will accomplish his mission as 
soon as he can. The “cleaning” will begin in a few weeks. 
 Report of the Hungarian Embassy, Bucharest, 7th February 1989. NAH XIX-J-1-j. 76. b. 
“Our cultural reporter has made an in interview with A. Pezderka who takes over the library 
in Romania. Pezderka told: The Romanian party does not intend to give back the books of 
500,000 ROL value, as defined in the earlier agreement. Strictly for our own information, 
he handed us a list composed by him about our orders. From the list it turns out that 
only a small quantity of the books ordered by them has been transported up to now, one 
part of them is still being printed, another was not even sent to the printery. According 
to Pezderka, the Romanian intention is clear: since he cannot satisfy our demands, based 
on the principle of reciprocity, he will decrease his orders from Hungary. Report of the 
Hungarian Embassy, Bucharest, 1st December 1989. NAH XIX-J-1-j. 77. b.
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vania populated by Hungarian majority. In 1985, 5 of the 22 final-year 
students got a job in Transylvania, and since 1987, it was the norm that 
Hungarians having a baccalaureate or a similar degree were employed 
in nearly exclusively Romanian-speaking areas.31 
The “Urbanization Project”
The situation worsened with news gradually coming out of Roma-
nia at the beginning of 1988 about the urbanization project of gigantic 
proportions, later called “village destruction” scheme. Romania de-
clared in March that the majority of the population of villages would be 
relocated to so-called “agricultural centers of urban character” within 
the framework of the urbanization project. According to his own ad-
mission, President Nicolae Ceauşescu was preparing for the project to 
run for more than 20 years.32 The details of the President and Secretary 
General of the Party were made known to the world in his speech de-
livered on 29th April 1988. The number of villages (then about 14,000) 
were to be cut by nearly half - declared Ceauşescu at the session of the 
Political Executive Committee of the Romanian Communist party. The 
Central Committee quickly accepted his declaration at its next session, 
and in May the 40 county party committees also announced support 
for the project. In place of the about 7,000 villages to be eliminated, 
they proposed to create 350,000 hectares of field and nearly 500 large 
industrial and agro-biological complexes. This project affected 2,000 
largely Hungarian settlements, mainly in counties Hargitha, Alba, Bi-
har, Cluj, Satu Mare and Covasna (See: Vincze 1994).
The initial shock was followed by sharp Hungarian, and then, inter-
national protests. Government agencies and non-governmental organi-
zations spoke up against the project. At the end of February the United 
States declared that they would deny Romania most favored nation sta-
tus because of its human rights record. The most favored nation status 
trade privilege had been given to Romania for its previous independent 
foreign policy posture within the Soviet bloc. The Government of the 
31 See: Cabinet Directive 54/1975 about the position of graduates in the industrial 
production.
32 The CC of RCP passed the principles of the improvement of the administrational-
territorial reorganisation of the country and of the urbanisation of villages in October 
1967. But exactly what it means was conceptualised by Ceauşescu in his comment held 
at the Congress of People’s Committee Presidents in 1976: “As for the urbanisation of 
villages we do our best to decrease the number of such settlements (...) and establish 
strong centres, the most important social and economic activities are focused on mainly 




Federal Republic of Germany learned about the village destruction plan 
with “the greatest anxiety”, as it would affect the German minority living 
in Romania. At the Vienna follow-up meeting (1986-1989) dealing with 
the Helsinki Final Agreement it was reiterated in several speeches that 
the provision of ethnic rights was an organic part of normal interstate 
relationships, and the meeting in Vienna could not ignore the event con-
nected to it.   
The Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs called in the ambassa-
dor of the Socialist Republic of Romania in the beginning of April and 
explained: the Hungarian government had been informed with deep 
anxiety about the fact that in Romania the names of settlements had 
been used only in Romanian from 3rd April. Furthermore, they told 
him that the elimination of smaller settlements would modify the eth-
nic composition of the country and this measure would discriminate 
against ethnic minorities. The forcible eviction of residents would vio-
late the most basic human rights; with the elimination of thousands 
of the villages inhabited by ethnic minorities their sense of commu-
nity and preservation of heritage would be weakened.33 In this situa-
tion, Károly Grósz made an unexpected announcement in the middle 
of July at the national meeting of Worker Guard commanders, when 
he declared that he would soon start official negotiations in the Social-
ist Republic of Romania.34 His proposal was accepted by the session of 
the Hungarian Socialist Worker’s Party Secretary on 28th March 1988, 
and the official invitation transmitted by Bucharest with the proviso 
that “the date of the visit should be diplomatically agreed”.35 According 
to the decision of the Political Committee made at the session on 14th 
June, the Secretaries of Foreign Affairs of the two parties should have 
a preparatory initial meeting where they would discuss the elements 
of the Hungarian-Romanian relationship. If these initial negotiations 
were successful, there would be a basis for the later negotiations with 
the Heads of the Governments and later a meeting of at Secretary Gen-
eral level.36
The demonstration held at the Heroes’s Square in Budapest on 27th 
June rewrote the planned scenario for both Budapest and Bucharest. At 
the mass demonstration organised for the first time since 1956 about 40 
to 50 thousand people (according to the police 20 to 30 thousand, and 
33 The events were published only three months later. The spokesman of Foreign Affairs Ko-
moróczki, István about the Romanian measures. Népszabadság 7 June 1988. 
34 Nationwide Congress of Worker Guard Commanders (Munkásőr-parancsnokok orszá-
gos találkozója). Népszabadság, 13 June 1988.
35 NAH M-KS 288. f. 7/802. 
36 NAH M-KS 288. f. 5/1028. 
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according to the participants more than 150 thousand) demonstrated 
against the plan of village destruction program.37 Next day the Roma-
nian Ministry of Foreign Affairs called in the Hungarian ambassador 
in Bucharest and informed him that the Romanian Government decid-
ed to close immediately the Hungarian Consulate in Cluj Napoca and 
demanded that the staff of the Consulate should leave Romania within 
48 hours. The decision was justified by  the Hungarian demonstrations 
against the Romanian resettlement plan.38
On the same day, the Council of Romanian Workers of Hungarian 
Nationality held session. The approved statement hailed as the greatest 
achievement of the Ceauşescu-era that is “securing consistently the total 
equality of all compatriots and the unity of the workers.” They resented 
and declared unacceptable the chauvinistic, irredentist, and revanchist 
manifestations of the People’s Republic of Hungary that “purposefully 
distort reality and treat with hostility the great achievements of the Ro-
manian people through the new socialist  social system that not only 
falsify the present, but also the historical past.” Next day the Central 
Committee of the Romanian Communist Party took up the question 
of the Romanian- Hungarian relations in a similar vein.39 Ceauşescu 
declared that “certain chauvinist and nationalistic circles, in order to 
distract attention from problems wanting for solutions, employ meth-
ods that even Horthy would not have allowed”.40
The tense situation and its background were summarised by a com-
prehensive report prepared in Bucharest that was forwarded to the 
Minister of Foreign Affairs by the Ambassador:41
Based on Nicolae Ceauşescu’s own conception, in the autumn of 
1986 we obtained the first information about a comprehensive plan of 
37 Heroes' Square (Hősök tere). ’June 88 27. editor.: Varga, Csaba. Eötvös, Budapest., 
1998.; Ara-Kovács, Attila: Mirage on the street corner (Délibáb az utcasarkon). Speaker 
(Beszélő), 1999, p. 9.
38 On 28th June the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Romania called in Szűcs, Pál, Hun-
garian ambassador in Budapest and informed him about the Romanian party and 
state leadership according to which the operation of the Consulate in Cluj Napoca is 
considered to be ceased, and the crew of the Consulate should leave Romanian within 48 
hours. Népszabadság 29th July 1989.
39 The letter of the CC to the HSWP. Népszabadság, 30 June 1988.
40 See: Forced orientations – minority policies (Történeti kényszerpályák - kisebbségi reál-
politikák). 
41 A falurombolási terv jelenlegi állása (The present situtation of the village destruction 
project). Pál Szűcs ambassador’s proposal forwarded to Minister of Foreign Affair 
Várkonyi, Péter. Embassy of the People’s Republic of Hungary, Bucharest, 12 December 




resettlement according to which a demarcation of area where settle-
ments can be built will be outlined, and the real estate and settlements 
outside that demarcation will be eliminated. According to the plans 
of that period, the affected real estate will be nationalized. The former 
owners will be compensated at 20% of the value of their property. These 
owners would be housed in rental units in the village center or else-
where in the new settlement, generally with smaller plots of land (250 
square meters). Vice Prime Minister Ion Dinca explained at the meet-
ing with Comrade Váncsa42 that with this new method, for example, 
with the elimination of superfluous roads they would gain back 500,000 
hectares of land for agriculture. Another objective was to eliminate the 
differences between villages and towns. 
From these conceptions evolved the program of village destruction 
and the bulldozer policy. The execution of the program would be just 
one component and symbol of the historically grandiose Ceauşescu-
era. In our view, the redrawing of the ethnic and geographical map of 
the country, is not directly linked to the broad range settlement pro-
gram worked out in the 1970’s in Romania. At that time there were no 
plans to eliminate half of the settlements.  Thais why it is untenable that 
Ceauşescu’s claim that the project undertaken would be a part of a 20 
year plan.
It is true that earlier resettlement plans were frequently discarded. 
The modification and destruction carried out in Bucharest were often 
done by on-site decision made by Ceauşescu himself (not only due to 
the building program of the new monumental government quarter) 
and as part of the creation of several town centres in the country. In un-
derdeveloped regions, for example in Moldova, the new centres meant a 
positive change, a kind of improvement; but in other cases, for example, 
in Transylvania, they contributed to the uprooting of historic and eth-
nic characteristics. The secretary general of the Romanian Communist 
party admitted that “settlements in Transylvania are more compact.” 
The plan of village destruction involving many settlements, real es-
tate and masses of people was unique in the world, and had from the 
very beginning a negative bent in terms of ethnic policy, as the settle-
ment program was designed to strengthen the Romanian character of 
ethnic areas and weaken the centuries-old compactness of Hungarian 
ethnic groups. The redrawing of the map of Romania by Ceauşescu 
would have extremely negative consequences for the Hungarian eth-
nic minority, their values and for the preservation of Hungarian and 
42  Váncsa, Jenő was the Minister of Agricultural Affairs between 1980 and 89, himself born 
in Brassow, Transylvania.
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European history and culture. Because the ethnic characteristics of 
towns were changed in the past 70 years in favour of  Romanians, the 
existence of the Hungarian ethnic communities remained more or less 
untouched in villages. The threatened disruption of this traditional 
network of villages posed the greatest danger. For example, the fate of 
churches and cemeteries was unclear; the majority of such properties 
were church property. We could assume that there may remain some 
historic buildings or monuments and others may be transferred by the 
church. As the churches, both Catholic and Protestant, lacked the nec-
essary financial means, many monuments would have been lost, just as 
it happened in Bucharest. The ethnic character of Transylvania would 
diminish with the redrawing of the map, and the replacement of many 
villages would with uniform new settlements and towns.
Between 1986 and 1988, many villages were destroyed around 
Bucharest and modest small settlements were built where the whole 
population were forced to move in. Around Snagov, in the autumn of 
1987 some villages were already destroyed. The former owners had to 
dismantle their own houses, or else they had to pay for the contactors 
to do it. In the new housing blocks they became not owners but ten-
ants. This was not only a violation of human rights, but also illustrated 
the coercive character of the whole project. 
It is noteworthy that the Romanian party leaders did not support 
the village destruction project until the beginning of 1987. The project 
was mentioned only in a few speeches given by Ceauşescu. The situ-
ation was the same in the time of the Congress of People’s Councils 
in March, where Ceauşescu argued for speeding up the resettlement 
plan. He declared that the number of 13,000 villages must be drasti-
cally reduced to 5 to 6,000. Upon the implementation of the plan, at 
most 2,000 villages would have remained, and, in accordance with the 
number of agricultural committees, 558 agricultural centers were to be 
established. Until 1990, two-three model agricultural centers were to 
be created, and by 1995 the building of agricultural towns would be 
completed, and by 2000 the whole project must be completed. 
After the congress, the resettlement of villages received a greater 
emphasis in the propaganda effort. The media got weekly instructions 
to promote the execution of the plan. The party’s Central Committee 
and representatives of the National Council of People’s Committees set 
up a committee in charge of carrying out the project, and the prime 
minister shortly thereafter became its leader. 
A decision, which was not made public, was made about the fact 




Although there were doubts about the feasibility of the program (at 
issue were financial resources and the capacity of the building indus-
try), but the dismantling phase was fast approaching. There was some 
personal informations from the ethnic areas of the county of Covasna, 
where the whole plan cycle would be completed by 1992. 
In fact, based on the speeches given by Nicolae Ceauşescu all prepa-
rations were made for the village destruction program. The area around 
Bucharest was a showcase of the consequences of the program (See also: 
Hunya 1989). 
When the report was made, “the top secret, highly confidential docu-
ment made exclusively for the highest state and party leadership” could 
no be known for the Hungarian embassy,  but the document was in pos-
session of the Hungarian intelligence “from an operational venue”, and it 
also reached the narrow leadership of the HSWP via the ministry of the 
interior’s department III/I.43 This department officially could not execute 
missions against “fraternal socialist countries” including Romania. On 
the other hand, its actual operational fields, marked with X, belonged to 
a “fraternal” socialist state. It was also an open secret that many agents 
of the Department of Foreign Intelligence of the Securitate, the Departa-
mentul de Informaţii Externe (DIE), was already active in Hungary.44 
The documents evaluating the meeting of the two parties’ secretar-
ies general on 28th August, 1998 in Arad, were drafted for the HSWP 
politburo by the foreign department of the CC, HSWP also called at-
tention to this issue: 
“Violating the agreements concerned, Romania is doing wide-range 
intelligence activities in Hungary. To neutralise these activities, the com-
petent authorities of the ministry of interior should assess the impact of 
these activities against our state security, including the circles connected 
43 Historical Archives of State Security Agency (hereafter: HASSA) (Állambiztonsági 
Szolgálatok Történeti Levéltára) Secretary of Deputy Minister of State Security’s Files 
(Állambiztonsági Miniszterhelyettesi Titkárság iratai) 1.11.1. 27. b. 45-13/13/a/1988. 
Budapest, July 1988, pp. 174-183.
44 Dr. Horváth, István (former Minister of the Interior): There was some cooperation 
between the organisations regulated by bilateral agreements. The Hungarians had such 
agreements with the German Democratic Republic, Yugoslavia and Austria, and we were 
preparing to sign such an agreement with the Federal Republic of Germany. So there were 
certain agreements of cooperation between certain countries. There was cooperation and 
(...) there was also competition. And there was a manifestation, I must say, that we did not 
like, let us say that it is not important to write about in the daily press, but the Yugoslavian 
intelligence was operating in Hungary, in the same way as the Romanian intelligence. 
Memorandum about the session of the Committee Examining the Intelligence Activities 
of the Prime Minister, 6th July 2002, Delegation Hall of the Parliament. NBB-5/2002-
2006.
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with embassy staff and the activities of Romanian intelligence present in 
Hungary.”45 
The document of the Hungarian intelligence forwarded to Buda-
pest, cited below was not on the agenda of the politburo, but all the 
members of this body as well as the secretaries of the Central Com-
mittee.46 The introduction of the report contains the summary of the 
ministry of the interior about the escalation of tensions up until 1988 
and their reasons: 
The competent authorities of the ministry of the interior – based on 
a high-level political decision – are continually informed about devel-
opments in the Romanian situation, Romanian moves and their out-
come. According to this: 
The Romanian authorities increased in July the discriminative ac-
tions taken against Hungarian missions and their staff in Romania. Se-
lective control at airports was extended to our personnel, as well as to 
our experts on long-term missions and their family members, includ-
ing their visiting relatives. 
In a departure from earlier practice, an incident took place involv-
ing a Hungarian holding a diplomatic passport which was confiscated 
and a shipment consigned and sealed by the ministry of foreign trade, 
was opened and returned to him 8 hours later. There is suspicion that 
our diplomatic pouches are monitored electronically. 
In conjunction with discriminative measures against Hungarian 
citizens assigned on official missions in Romania, the Romanian au-
thorities were trying to give the impression that the Hungarian govern-
ment was unable or unwilling to provide the appropriate circumstances 
for the unhindered operation of the Romanian embassy in Budapest. 
The advisor assigned to liaise with Romanian diplomats accredited in 
Budapest told diplomats of other countries that an expert of the Ro-
manian ministry of foreign affairs visited  Budapest at the beginning of 
this month (July) and his assignment was to make preparation for the 
evacuation of  embassy staff and families. 
It was rumoured that the successor of the incumbent Romanian am-
bassador in Budapest would not be career diplomat, but a well-known 
historian or academic, or perhaps only a caretaker official. 
45 NAH M-KS 288. f. 5/1035.
46 Sent to: Comrades Grósz, Károly; Dr. Berecz, János; Csehák, Judit; Hámori, Csaba; 
Iványi, Pál; Lukács, János; Németh, Miklós ; Nyers, Rezső ; Pozsgai, Imre; Szabó, István ; 




There were signs that there was resistance against the resettlement 
plan. Apparently the leaders of Covasna and Hargitha counties were 
trying to hinder the implementation of the programs by failing to  pre-
pare in a timely manner  proposals for elimination of villages and were 
also trying to seek to obtain concessions from the central authorities.
Contemporary observers surmised that given the dissatisfaction 
with the resettlement program in some villages populated by both 
Hungarians and Romanians, the emphasis of Ceauşescu’s speeches had 
shifted. In one of his speeches he said that the measures did not have to 
be acted upon so urgently, and in another there was a variation in the 
number of settlements to be destroyed. 
There were prominent personalities and their family members 
among the Romanian citizens migrating to Hungary from Romania 
and not intending to return home. These included the children of high-
ranking officers of the Securitate, the daughter of the former minister of 
the interior, an ex-body guard of Ceausescu.
On the Romanian side of the border everything was done to prevent 
the migration of people. A Securitate brigade of 2,800 was dispatched to 
the Romanian-Hungarian border. Their main task was to prevent illegal 
emigration of Romanian citizens to Hungary and to strengthen border 
control. To reinforce border guards, newly recruited Worker Guards 
were also deployed. On 15th July of 1987 shots were fired at a railway car 
behind the international express train to Biharkeresztes, and there are 
also unconfirmed reports of the presence of Securitate officers, with the 
mission to create confusion among refugees in Hungary. 
We obtained the rough Hungarian translation of a top secret docu-
ment issued by the Romanian Communist party for high-level political 
leaders. The material – assuming that was not disinformation – gives us 
an insight to the thinking of the highest Romanian leadership about the 
relationship of the two countries and about likely “solutions”. 
Our agencies are monitoring events and adopting measures consis-
tent with  their sphere of authority. 
The Bucharest-originated document provided no further infor-
mation about purpose and character of the material itself or the cir-
cumstances surrounding its distribution, and there was not comment 
on part of Hungarian intelligence either. But the observation that the 
document “may have been sent to us as a provocation” suggest suspi-
cion on the part of  department III/I. In addition, the translation of the 
text was not done by the Hungarian state security agencies either, but 
“a rough and extracted translation” was obtained by Hungarian intel-
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ligence. Much of this raises the question whether or not it was possible 
that a document drafted in Romanian “for the highest political leader-
ship” could be translated into Hungarian at once in the Ceauşescu-era, 
or it is only a bogus disinformation document made for the Hungarian 
government.
However, the style and content of the document suggested that the 
document may be genuine and was intended for the  Romanian party 
bureaucracy’s mid-level leadership. From  documents of the HSWP, it 
was known that proposals were deemed to complete only when the is-
suers of the concerned departments were identified.  In the document 
obtained, the issuers were the secretary, the CC and the secretariat of 
the Romanian Communist party. Therefore, it can be assumed that the 
document was confidential and was prepared by the department of agi-
tation of propaganda of the CC with active contributions from the DIE 
(Romania’s security agency) and was intended to provide guidelines for 
the party apparatus (and perhaps leading press representatives) on how 
to handle the tense situation leading up to the summer of 1988. The 
stylistic feature of the document was that it contained “apparat-speak”, 
such as “our beloved Homeland, dear Romania”, “the great leader of 
the Romanian nation, of our homeland, Comrade Ceaşescu” may also 
support this assumption. Langauge of this sort was widely used in mass 
propaganda but rarely appeared in documents for the highest political 
leadership. 
The document, however, contains some really remarkable info-
rmation:
All the conditions necessary to go forward with the resettlement  -
project summarised in nine points were ready for the elimination 
of more then 7,000 villages. These conditions included the project 
timeline, the financial and technical requirements, including the 
involvement of Romanian National Army. However, in the light of 
subsequent events, the effect of vehement domestic and international 
protests could not have been an exaggeration, even though we do 
not have more precise information on this. 
The Romanian government imposed serious conditions to continue  -
the Romanian-Hungarian talks with the probable aim that upon 
the likely refusal of those conditions the Hungarian side could be 
portrayed as uncompromising in resuming dialogue.  Otherwise, the 
Romanian side would not have demanded next to the high-minded 
respect for Romanian  national sovereignty, the absurd demand 





During 1987, according to Romanian data, altogether 1,262 citizens  -
migrated to Hungary, while Hungarian statistics list 10,445 people. 
The difference may be explained by the arrival illegal migrants and 
those who arrived in Hungary with a valid passport but refused 
to return to Romania. The Hungarian ministry of the interior 
declared on 10th June 1988 that from the beginning of the year 4,977 
Romanian citizens had declared that they did not wish to return 
home. By the end of the year, 12,273 people were granted temporary 
residence by the Hungarian authorities.   
The original text of this “the top secret, highly confidential docu-
ment” is:
Recently, the humiliation of our beloved homeland, our dear Ro-
mania and the international discredit of the whole Romanian nation 
and the smears against our great leader of our homeland comrade 
Ceauşescu and the whole Romanian leadership has continued. 
Certain countries interfere in the internal affairs of Romania and 
endanger the revolutionary socialist achievements and endanger our 
socialist state. Our beloved  Romania has always strived that those who 
live in Romania should have the same rights and obligations. It must be 
accepted that people living in Romania are Romanian citizens regard-
less of their nationality.
The party and state leadership of the People’s Republic in Hungary 
are pursuing a nationalistic policy. The political leaders want to create a 
distraction from the serious economic and social problems of the coun-
try. They do their best to discredit socialism building Romania before 
the international public with falsehoods.  The Hungarian leadership 
also misinforms the Hungarian people about the real conditions in Ro-
mania, on the rights and the life ethnic minorities of our country and 
they portray a false account of our resettlement program.
Suffice it to say that the Hungarian People’s Republic’s economy is 
burdened with high debt, some 19 billion dollars that at this moment it is 
unable to repay.  The country sustains itself by borrowing. The economic 
development of Hungary is far behind Romania’s achievements.
Hungarian goods cannot be sold abroad, the Hungarian technol-
ogy, chemical industry and other branches of industries are completely 
outdated. The exchange of goods has been the characteristic of the Ro-
manian-Hungarian commerce for a long time. It is only due to the un-
derstanding of Romania and the patience of Comrade Ceauşescu that 
Romania is willing to buy low-quality products from Hungary. 
Henceforth the economic relationships will have to be revised. Ro-
mania cannot endlessly sacrifice its economy to help a country that 
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permanently violates the rules of cooperation, a country that is en-
couraging Romanian citizens to leave their homeland, encouraging the 
Romanian workers to act against our beloved homeland and discredit 
Romanian socialist achievements abroad. 
The chauvinist leaders of Hungary, instead of solving their own so-
cial problems, interfere in the affairs of neighbouring fraternal socialist 
country, under the leadership of the great builder of socialism, son of 
our beloved homeland and the people, Comrade Ceauşescu.  The Hun-
garian leadership also denigrates the Romanian nation.
The Hungarian government calls the criminals escaping from the 
rightful fury and punishment of the Romanian people refugees. At the 
same time, the Hungarian Government keeps secret that thousands of 
Hungarians citizens search for asylum abroad and request political asy-
lum in other countries, without intentions to return to Hungary. 
Certainly, we cannot and do not want to solve the internal social 
crisis of the People’s Republic of Hungary, but we expect the Hungar-
ian government to solve these issues within their own country, and 
they should not be involved in the Romanian nation’s revolutionary 
building of socialism. That is why we, at international forums, such as 
in   Vienna, declare that all states should solve their own problems, and 
states should be banned from interfering in the internal affairs of other 
states.
Hungary makes territorial demands on our beloved homeland 
coupled with concern about the situation of our Romanian workers 
of Hungarian nationality. The chauvinist leaders of Hungary also keep 
it secret that there are ancient Romanian territories and what is more, 
also in the territory of Hungary, Romanian towns and townspeople.   
If someone could have territorial demands, then it would be our 
dear homeland, Romania; but we do not speak about these rightful de-
mands for the sake of friendship and the peace of neighboring peoples. 
But we are always ready to defend our socialist achievements against 
aggressors, with arms if we must. We are not afraid of threats, particu-
larly not in the use of military force. The Hungarian attempts to con-
quer territory are condemned to failure. It does not only derive from 
the qualities of the Romanian National Army, but also from the high-
level preparedness, commitment and patriotism. 
We have the appropriate information about the fact that based on 
their equipment, the Hungarian Army can be called modern, but in 
its thinking it, morally, is still at the level of Horthy’s army, and as for 
its human material, it is far behind our National Army. The Hungarian 




The only military force that can be called modern is the Hungar-
ian air force, although the airplanes are getting older, and there is no 
money to replace them. At the same time, the homeland air force of our 
beloved homeland Romania has the equipment to defend our national 
air space. 
The Romanian national army will undertake enormous tasks in the 
forthcoming resettlement program. On the one hand, in conformity 
with regional development regulations, our units will participate in the 
creation of newly designed functional districts; on the other hand, they 
will participate in the planned transfer of residents, assisting to convert 
the newly freed areas for agriculture. 
The resettlement program begun on 1st June (of 1988) must be ac-
celerated in every area. All assistance and support must be provided to 
the individuals and organizations that were appointed by the central 
administration to carry out the required tasks The Presidential decree 
clearly determines the tasks.  
Within the territory of the county, the following tasks are to be done 
apart from the already mentioned: 
Early registration of the population (composition of families, age.  -
occupation, nationality, qualification, social status, etc.) 
Estimating the required labor force, occupational distribution and  -
evaluation of requirements.
Definition of the new functional districts. Estimating the  -
requirements of skilled labor, with special attention to industrial 
capacity. 
To achieve the goals of the project, residents need a structured  -
reorientation. In this task local People’s Council and the emerging 
new People’s Councils and divisions of Party organizations will 
have a special role. The police will be in charge  of public order.
The new building area must be secured and the dismantled area  -
must have protective measures to avoid encroachment during the 
building phase.
Each citizen has to be given a job somewhere in the country. With  -
this step we want to guarantee each Romanian citizen the right 
to work. If the citizen does not want to take the assigned position, 
this does not exempt the citizen of the obligation to move to the 
designated residence. Refusal to move or placing stumbling block 
against moving endangers the great socialist transformation of 
our country, and requires appropriate measures on part of the 
authorities wish to accept the position granted to him or her, he or 
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she is not exempted from the obligation to move to the previously 
marked region and dwelling place. Denying moving endangers the 
socialistic reformation of our Homeland; therefore, the authorities 
are obliged to make the appropriate measures against it.
Each citizen must be granted the chance to voluntarily undertake  -
to move and accept a position, for a certain period of time, in the 
resettlement areas.
Proper provision must be made citizens moving, including food  -
supply and other social services (health care, school, kindergarten, 
etc.). 
Moving requests for multiple families is only possible within the  -
framework of voluntary moving. In case of non-voluntary moving, 
we must insist on strictly adhering to the requirements of the 
economy and the regional experts. The proximity of relatives is 
not reason enough to ignore the strict principles of moving to the 
designated residence.
As for ownership matters, our guiding principle is that all land with-
in the territory of our beloved Homeland Romania are state property; 
therefore, they are exclusively managed by the state. 
As for the ownership and breeding of animals, a separate amend-
ment of the decree will be drafted, considering the resettlement project 
and the formation economic areas.  The areas have to strive to become 
self-supporting.       
We have an enormous set of tasks before us – the creation of nearly 
500 industrial agro-biological complexes – but this is endangered by 
the neighbouring People’s Republic of Hungary by attempting to thwart 
the development our socialist society.
The chauvinistic Hungarian Government does not consider the re-
ality of socialism, the fact that our dear Homeland Romania lead by its 
great and faithful son Comrade Ceauşescu is working on the realisation 
of a developed society. Nothing proves the anti-socialist nature of the 
chauvinistic Hungarian Government more than the fact that the heroic 
son of our Nation Comrade Ceauşescu, on occasion of his 70th birthday 
was awarded, on behalf of the Soviet party and state leaders, with the 
Order of Lenin. If the accusations about our beloved Homeland and 
its great leader Comrade Ceauşescu disseminated by the chauvinistic 
Hungarian political leaders were true, then he would not have been 
awarded with this order for building socialism. The award itself is the 
best example that the Romanian Government represents the socialist 




This is why the dialogue between the Central Committee of the Ro-
manian Communist Party and the Central Committee of Hungarian 
Socialist Worker’s Party will take place only if  in the future the Hungar-
ian leadership:
Desists in a policy of humiliation the Romanian Nation and its  -
leaders. 
Desists in the shameful forgeries of history -
Ceases the interference in Romanian national internal affairs -
Commits to stop disinformation about Romania in the Hungarian  -
press and literature, banning all writings and articles humiliating 
Romania
Accepting the fact that that Romania has jurisdiction over any  -
Romanian citizens, regardless of nationality
Repatriates Romanian citizens illegally migrating to Hungary  -
without preconditions
Repatriates Romanian citizens who travelled to Hungary with  -
official travel documents, and after the expiration of such documents 
did not return to Romania 
Strictly abides by the Treaty of Friendship and other important  -
international conventions related to Romania
Withdraws declarations that are against general principles of peace  -
and international relations
 Initiates legal proceedings against those that express hostility  -
against Romania and the development of socialism by the Romanian 
people.
Makes a commitment to strictly abide human rights and enforces  -
them. Guarantees housing and jobs to all residents of Hungary until 
de Millennium.
Solves the issue of alcoholism and drugs, and ends illiteracy -
Commits not to violate Romanian territorial sovereignty -
Commits to best practices in economic relationships and takes notice  -
that Romania cannot henceforth support the troubled Hungarian 
economy.
Desists interfering in the affairs workers of Hungarian nationality  -
living in the territory of Romania, and takes note of the protest of 
the Committee of Ethnic Workers. 
The nationality has been solved in the socialist Romania, since laws 
guarantee rights and the ethnic minorities can have their own journals, 
schools, cultural institutions and book publishing houses.
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Under the leadership of Comrade Ceauşescu, the heroic son of our 
beloved Romania, exemplary cooperation developed with the workers 
of German nationality in Romania Those who wanted to leave our be-
loved Homeland Romania could leave it on condition that the German 
State taking them will permanently contribute to their livelihood and 
that the state receiving emigrants pays to our homeland the social cost 
of services such health care and education.
We do not exclude similar mutually agreed upon solution for a 
determined number of Romanian workers of Hungarian nationality. 
Certainly, Hungary should defray with convertible currency the social 
expenses of each emigrant. The People’s Republic of Hungary would 
provide proper jobs and housing for the immigrants. The Romanian 
contracting party should have access to the emigrants to ensure their 
welfare. Only under these conditions would the Highest Council con-
sider taking away their Romanian citizenship.
The Romanian people have manifested great patience towards the 
Hungarian people under the direction the prominent personality of 
our Comrade Ceauşescu. We hope that the Hungarian leadership will 
finally recognise their mistaken policy and will cooperate with our 
people in the interest of social and economic progress and independent 
socialist development.
Both party and state leaders are responsible for their people, for 
history, and for humanity. Based on this, we cannot renounce from 
furthering our economic and social development and we cannot al-
low ourselves to leave the path of building socialism, the modification 
of our economic and regional landscape to allow the elevation of our 
people. This is why we have redouble our efforts to carry out as soon as 
possible the resettlement and economic plan. To achieve this we have 
to mobilize our people, our party so that we can stand up as one man 
for the sake of the flourishing of our beloved Homeland the Socialistic 
Romania. 
Secretary General of the RCP
Central Commitee of the RCP
Secretariat of the RCP
Classification Clause: 
The material is top secret, made exclusively for the highest state and 
party leadership with a determined serial number, in a number of cop-
ies indicated below; therefore  secrecy guidelines must be followed in 




‘Because the above cited  documents were undated, we can have  as-
sumptions about it. On the one hand, the supplement refers to the fact 
that “the resettlement should be accelerated from the 1st of July.” By indi-
cating the day, the report itself also refers to a date in July. However, it is 
precisely known that the report was on the agenda of a meeting chaired 
by the Hungarian deputy minister of interior on 20th September, 1988. 
After discussing the report, the chairman summed up the discussions. 
As for the political situation, he established that the opinion of  various 
communist parties was not completely the same about ethnic issues, 
and added that the socialist camp is not completely unified in evaluat-
ing these matters.
“The interest of our policy – he added – is to prove the anticipated 
negative consequences of the policy of the Romanian party, but at the 
same time, it must do its best to build legal contacts for cooperation and 
to develop in the direction of mutual understanding. At the moment, 
the manifold possibilities of strengthening contacts and the examina-
tion of communication methods are the most important factors. In this 
case, it is natural that national security agencies become more active, 
but despite this situation, we must react to the events in a moderate 
and sober manner. Therefore, we should be informed about different 
political events, not only considering the state security aspect. We can 
help the political leadership if we exploit our multiple opportunities of 
information and explore the realities based on facts, providing a clear 
picture for the decision-making”.47 
After the digressing on the role of security agencies, it is worth con-
tinuing the exploration of the embassy report mentioned above that 
summed up the history of the village destructions in 1988 until the end 
of the year:48
By the summer of 1988, conditions were ready to begin the resettle-
ment program, international protests also grew. The Romanian gov-
ernment was forced to consider this fact, even if they have not given 
up their plans.  The protests had its results, even if ending the program 
was not a realistic expectation. The Romanian Government changed 
their tactics in several steps. At least they attempted to make the project 
more acceptable, but later they extended the deadline for the initiation 
of the program. 
47 Secretariat of Deputy Minister of State Security’s Files HASSSA 1.11.1. 27. b. 45-13/13/
a/1988. Budapest, July 1988, pp. 174-183.
48 The present situation of village destruction plans. Proposal of Ambassador Szűcs, Pál 
forwarded to Péter Várkonyi, Minister of Foreign Affairs. (A falurombolási terv jelenlegi 
állása. Szűcs Pál nagykövet felterjesztése Várkonyi Péter külügyminiszternek.) Embassy 
of the People’s Republic of Hungary, Bucharest, 12th December 1988.
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In July and August, the Romanian regime tried to make the “reset-
tlement project” more acceptable in two directions. On the one hand, 
with the control of propaganda, they tried to influence  public opinion 
in a positive direction. The county authorities attempted to gain the 
support of the population with differentiated policies and tried to si-
lence the protestors. The press justified the historical necessity of the 
program, as a natural process. Although the acceleration of the process 
seriously burdened the state, it served the interests of the population. 
At the same time, the use of the word “destruction” was prohibited; 
only “modernisation” and “development” could be mentioned. Later, 
from September on, among the arguments cited was that they intended 
to stabilise the village population in place, providing appropriate ed-
ucational, cultural and health services for them. Towards diplomatic 
corps they emphasised that the process is voluntary, constitutionality 
sanctioned, and that buildings can be dismantled only with the permis-
sion of the citizens, and the whole exercise serves a humane process. 
In county Hargitha, the first copies of applications in which a Székely 
villager requested the dismantling of his house to be replaced by new 
modern town-like dwelling in the settlement. This process was boy-
cotted in Cehetel, Simonesti, Tipari, Timis and Bodovice. Another 
method was applied in Bodos, a small settlement in county Covasna: 
the local People’s Committee “asked for” the elimination of the settle-
ment in the name of the local population, saying that the village had no 
prospects for development. Nationalistic propaganda was used among 
the Romanian population of villages in the Banat region: “the forces of 
the Romanian nation broken up by history must be joined again.” In 
several places, those who refused moving to village centres were threat-
ened with sanctions.    
Theese attempts were shielded from the public, as also was kept 
from the public the intended deadline of mid-August to complete the 
resettlement project. In county Maros, they wanted to eliminate 266 
villages from 487. According to the plan, 91 small villages also would 
be reduced to 76.
In county Hargitha,  from the 264 villages were listed 110 villages for 
destruction. This network of Hungarian settlements goes back to the 
14th century, and the churches were built in the 14-15th centuries. Ac-
cording to the original plans, after completion, the list of villages to be 
destroyed would have been published, and the nationwide execution 
of the urbanisation project would have begun from September. Public 
notification was delayed as a tactical ploy.  
The first information was leaked in August and stated that that 




building of agricultural centres would start this year with minimal dis-
ruption and without the use of bulldozers.  However, these plans were 
also delayed. That is why dismantling or destruction works did not be-
gin in Transylvania. 
Another tactical modification was observable from September, of 
1988 in parallel with the delay of the execution of the plans. It is imagin-
able that only the name of the centre will remain from the villages to be 
integrated, that is, the little settlements nearby will be attached to agri-
cultural centres. These settlements can loose their name and live on un-
der the name of the central village. For example, the name of Chiurus, 
the birthplace of Sándor Kőrösi Csoma would be attached to Brates, a 
village quite far from Chiurus, and the village will officially become a 
“street” of Brates. If small villages are then eliminated, it is not a settle-
ment, such as Chiurus that will be eliminated, only a street. 
This “rearrangement” would subordinate centuries-old Hungarian 
villages with very young Romanian settlements. According to the plans, 
the small villages Borosneu Mic and Dobolii de Sus belonging to the 
village Borosneu Mare will be attached to the township Valea Mare to 
be established. Valea Mare is a village with about 1,200 inhabitants, and 
at the moment belongs to the town of Intorsura Buzalui. It is a com-
pletely newly established settlement inhabited by Romanian majority. 
Borosneu Mic has 500, Dobilii di Sus has 300 inhabitants, both of them 
are Hungarian villages. Borosneu Mic is one of the most ancient settle-
ments in the region, Balázs Orbán indicates it in an article published in 
Székelyföld that the villages was registered with 16 gates in 1567. 
Another similar plan of “reattachment” betrays the same intention 
of Romanisation. The authorities are preparing to attach the villages 
Lisnau and Bicfalau from township Uzon to Dobirlau. Dobirlau is a vil-
lage with 1,000 inhabitants, all of them Romanian, but it gained the 
rank of township a few years ago. It was established in a forest clearing 
location. However, Bicfalau was an independent parish already in the 
14th century, and Lisnau is a similarly ancient settlement, both of them 
are inhabited by Hungarians.
Another possibility that may soon be introduced is the slow choking 
of the condemned villages. Schools, shops, health service and transport 
would be eliminated in these settlements, and no new building permits 
or restorations would be permitted. This is a tool to compel people to 
move in the newly established centres. In county Covasna, there were 
at least 30 such small villages. 
By September, the press was given instructions to slow the propa-
ganda effort. They did not have to write about the different phases of 
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the execution anymore declared by Ceauşescu. Later, 2010 was cited as 
the final deadline for completing the project instead of the previously 
indicated 2000. 
At the full session of the Romanian Communist Party on 28-30th  
November of 1988, the secretary general was dealing with the village 
destruction plans relatively much. He emphasised that the plans must 
urgently be executed. In this sense, he strengthened the village destruc-
tion program. We can evaluate the situation like this, because the ses-
sion passed the speech edited based on the “April Theses”. Ceauşescu 
in his April speech had spoken about the elimination of a few hundred 
townships and he said that it is necessary to eliminate 50 percent of the 
villages. He declared the plans must be finalized in a few months. The 
unchanged character of the final aim is indicated by the declaration in 
the speech given on 28th November that 558 agricultural-industrial cen-
tres would be established with the development of existing villages. At 
the same time – evidently for tactical reasons – he was speaking about 
the issues from different perspectives once again. He said that up to 
1995 in the towns, and until 2000 in the whole country, in its main out-
line, the housing issue will be solved. Apart from his speech in March, 
he did not speak about the fate of the 13,000 villages, but only about 
the 2,300 townships to which administratively all the villages will be at-
tached. Despite his speech given in April, he declared that the number 
of townships will be preserved, but he could do it easily, since if the 
village destruction project is completed, 6,000 villages will remain; that 
is, more than 2,300 townships. According to his declaration owners of 
houses outside the borders of the settlements do not have to destroy 
their houses, but new buildings can be built only within the borders. 
This also suggests a silent intention to go ahead with the village de-
struction project. In a village, a family can have a plot of 200-300 square 
metre, including the house, the courtyard and agricultural activities. 
These criteria can make for significant further changes possible, since 
there aren’t such  small plots practically anywhere in the country. In the 
end, Ceauşescu said that the establishment of modern dwellings in the 
villages is an objective requirement to be provided by socialism, and 
he is convinced that serious steps will be taken in this field in the next 
decade. Ceauşescu spoke about assisting the population with building 
materials and credits, which reveals that the Government was aware 
that the available resources of the state are insufficient to carry out the 
resettlement plan and the population should take at least part of the 
burden. 
In our opinion, the available record clearly expose the original in-




withdrawal from untenable positions, but a tactical modification of the 
same. A decision was made about the application of deceptive methods 
and about delayed implementation of the project. Ceauşescu never said 
– although the deputation of the Christian Democratic Faction of the 
EU Parliament also encouraged him to do so – that he would give up 
on his plan of village destruction., When Ceauşescu was in power no 
decision was ever withdrawn; at best, some were not carried out. 
Our main argument is that despite the many warnings, the village 
destruction project was not given up or withdrawn, and tactical steps 
did not deceive anyone in the rest of the world. We can also emphasise 
that Romania was also responsible for exaggerating press positions in 
the same way that was responsible for the original plans. Since they did 
not provide credible information and also refused any fact finding pos-
sibilities. At the same time, we have to bring to light other forcible and 
discriminative measures of assimilation against the ethnic minorities 
apart from the plans of village destruction, namely the cutback of native 
language education and the lack of cultural facilities, the exchange of 
population and the forcible relocation of students. 
The popularisation of the program in the country or in Transylvania 
was conceivable. According to the regimes’s economic plan of next year, 
(which next year?) 40,000 dwellings would be built in a rural environ-
ment, and according to the five-year plan, this quantity of flats will be 
doubled. This number was taken over by the propaganda after the ex-
tended session of the CC of the RCP on 28-30th November of 1988.
The mentioned report stating that “only tactical modifications were 
introduced, the decision was made about the application of deceptive 
methods and the delay of the beginning of the project” was supported 
by the events that happened next year. It is not only about  villages to be 
eliminated would not be destroyed, but they would let them perish “on 
their own. (Süle 1990) The political leadership applied ever-increasing 
manipulative means when they tried to make people leave their ancient 
settlements on a voluntary basis. In the first phase, village assemblies 
were convened, and these assemblies “democratically” voted the inte-
gration of neighbouring settlements in certain counties. The integra-
tion of the settlements of mixed population required separate tactics. 
The “interests of assimilation” could also be realised on the other way 
round; that is, also Romanian villages could be integrated into villages 
of Hungarian population. These times, the remaining Hungarian pop-
ulation was “attenuated” by changing the original ethnic composition. 
Furthermore, on top of this, the decision-making process does not 
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follow the stated guideline whereby economically weaker settlements 
should be attached to stronger ones.49 
The open anti-Hungarian foreign policy of Romania could not lead 
to open military confrontation due to the still existing, although weak 
ties of the Warsaw Pact50, while Moscow finally gave up the intention 
“to at least preserve the traces of peace between the two countries”. 
(Rip 2006: 503) The deadlock of the conflict can be dated to the weeks 
before Ceauşescu’s failure. News of more or less reliability of Roma-
nian army arrived in the entire year51, but all of this was overcome by 
information out of Budapest published in the Austrian press accord-
ing to which Romania had been preparing for military action against 
Hungary in the autumn.52 The same information could be obtained by 
the Hungarian ministry of the interior when the ministry warned the 
Politburo of the HSWP53 about Romanian preparations of  military ac-
tion against Hungary in a background report on 19th June 1989. The 
Hungsarian mininister of defense was afraid of similar conflicts: “With 
my colleagues we concluded that that Ceauşescu clan, to preserve their 
power, may decide on adventurous steps, and it is not even excluded 
that they will take some aggressive, provocative steps against Hungary.” 
(Kárpáti, 2000) 
The negotiations between the Opposition Round Table  and the  So-
viet embassy in the second half of 1989 were noteworthy events of this 
49 The cessation of townships in Maros county (Maros megyei községek megszüntetése). 
Embassy of the People’s Republic of Hungary, Bucharest, 10 May 1989. Declassified do-
cuments of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1989. NAH XIX-J-1-j. 77. b. 112/Szt/89.
50 Borhi, László: “It is Hungary’s duty to remain in the Warsaw Treaty – international 
connections of the changes in 1989 in the mirror of Hungarian sources („Magyarország 
kötelessége a varsói Szerződésben maradni” – az 1989-es átmenet nemzetközi össze-
függései magyar források tükrében). Foreign Affairs (Külügyi Szemle), 1007. summer-
autumn.
51 “After the rearrangement of the division of Moldavia that was done in the end of last 
year, in Transylvania where massive military forces were ordered from different areas 
of the country, the population gave information about military operations. At the same 
time, a serious number of reservist officers were called in.” HASSA Intelligence Reports. 
Romania in 1989 was planning a military offensive against Hungary. Allegedly they are 
convinced that they can quickly reach the line of the river Tisza unhindered before the 
Hungarian Army could mobilise its units in the Dunántúl region.” Daily Operational 
Reports, summarising reports 21 June 1989. HASSA 2.7.1. 062111. 
52 Embassy of the People’s Republic of Hungary, Vienna, 3 August 1989. Secret Archives 
Files, Declassified documens, Austria 1989. NAH XIX-J-1-j. 20. b. Foreign Office 
003390.
53 The proposal of the Department of International Party Relations of the CC of the HSWP 
forwarded to the Presidency about our participation at the session of the Political Nego-





period. For the first time, Russian ambassador Boris Ivanovics Stukalin 
visited the session of the Opposition Round Table in the Parliament 
on 18th August 1989. He replied to the question about the Hungarian 
population across the border diplomatically, without mentioning any 
concrete information: “We have to admit that on ethnic issues many 
deviations from the Leninist approach, were in evidence mainly in re-
cent years.”54 Two days later Ivan Aboimov, the Soviet deputy minister 
of foreign affairs met with the representatives of the Round Table.  On 
behalf of the Hungarian Democratic Forum (MDF) Jozsef Antall draft-
ed a statement that may seem strange today. It stated that, if Hungary 
were to remain in the Warsaw Treaty Organization, (WTO) it can be a 
guarantee against  attacks from neighbouring states, and naming Ro-
mania he said that “the possibility of attack cannot be excluded”.55
The session of the Political Consultative Committee of the WTO 
held in July 1989 in Bucharest gave an opportunity for the Hungarian 
and Romanian party leaders to meet. Upon the request of then HSWP 
chairman Rezső Nyers, the meeting was considered an “unofficial ne-
gotiation of comrades”, the proceedings of which were not published.56 
The chairman of the HSWP brought up the issue of political relations 
between Hungary and Romania. As he saw it, since the bilateral sum-
mit meeting of Ceausescu and HSWP secretary general Grosz in Au-
gust 1988 in Arad, had failed to improve but, on the contrary, reached 
a low point.  In fact, no proposals of the Hungarian side had been an-
swered and all were ultimately rejected. The declaration on nationali-
ties planned at the meeting of Arad was not prepared while the debate 
over the resettlement program had international repercussions and was 
continuing. “It is true that this is a Romanian internal affair – Rezső Ny-
ers added – but it generates nationality problems in nationality areas, 
transcends our borders and worsens our relations.”
Ceauşescu responded in a sharp tone by saying that Romania was 
an independent socialist state that solved its problems on its own. On 
this basis, the Romanian government would not permit the presence of 
54 The session of the Round Table of the Opposition, the visit of the ambassador of the Soviet 
Union 18 August 1989 (Az Ellenzéki kerekasztal ülése, a Szovjetunió nagykövetének 
látogatása 1989 augusztus 18). In: The scenario of the change of the regime. Round table 
negotiations in 1989 (A rendszerváltás forgatókönyve. Kerekasztaltárgyalások 1989-ben) 
Vol 3. (editor: András Bozóki), Magvető, 1999, p. 245
55 Memorandum about the meeting of Ivan Aboimov with opposition politician 17 October 
1989. Declassified documents of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Soviet Union/1989. 
NAH XIX-J-1-j. 84. b.
56 Nyers, Rezső’s report to the Operative Committee of Political Affairs 10 July 1989. HSWP 
CC Information Reports. 1980-1989. NAH M-KS 288. f. 11. 890708, pp. 213-219
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an international control commission to monitor the resettlement pro-
gram. In his view, this Hungarian initiative amounts to nothing less 
than a deliberate attack on the friendship of the two peoples.”
Regarding the resettlement program, Ceauşescu said that such phe-
nomena can also be observed in other places. The program was started 
20 years ago, with the aim of improving the living conditions of village 
residents. He agreed with an earlier proposal that a Hungarian delega-
tion should visit Romania in order to study the issue as soon as pos-
sible. He pointed to the fact that it was the Hungarians who did not 
want to receive a Romanian counterpart delegation; at the same time, 
the Hungarians were emphasising the control functions of their pro-
posed delegation. International visitor rules designate the host country 
as organizer of the visitor’s programs. However, the Hungarian delega-
tion might visit counties with a Hungarian majority, but visitors should 
experience the entire territory of Romania. Romania “is one of  the few 
countries” – declared Ceauşescu – where, in the widest sense of the 
word,  there is native language education, local and national newspa-
pers are published in the language of the nationalities as well as func-
tioning theatres.” He called it strange that these facts were not known 
in Hungary, or if they were known, then the Hungarians distorted these 
facts. The Romanians would like, he added, “that Hungarian citizens of 
Romanian descent would enjoy the same rights as the nationalities in 
Romania.” 
At the height of these inconclusive and essentially futile negotia-
tions, Nyers commented that “along the Hungarian-Romanian border, 
tourists are literally undressed, and even the newspaper Népszabadság 
(the HSWP’s official organ) was confiscated. Such incidents were not 
present in any of our other borders. (…) We consider the restriction 
on Népszabadság contrary to principles of free movement.” Ceauşescu’s 
response contained the usual phrases: Romania could not allow the im-
port of press material containing views with which we could not agree. 
“If Népszabadság publishes only articles about Hungary, then it will be 
allowed in Romania. But if it promotes ideas of western socialism, ar-
guing for the supremacy of the west, then it would not be allowed in.”
Despite the above, at the session of the HSWP Politburo on 24th July 
1989 decided that a delegation of the Hungarian Parliament should 
travel to Romania in the near future to study resettlement issues, and 
with a similar purpose, a Romanian delegation should be received in 
Hungary.57 




Hardly a week later, the proposal went nowhere. On 3rd August 1989, 
György Fejti received Romanian ambassador Traian Pop at his own re-
quest, and the ambassador handed to him the following memorandum 
from the Romanian Communist party and government: 
The leadership of the Romanian Communist party and the govern-
ment of the Romanian Socialist Republic considers the interview with 
Mihai, former king of Romania aired in the program “Panorama” of the 
Hungarian television on July 31st as an anti-Romanian, anti-socialist 
and fascist provocation, and a direct attack against the independence 
and sovereignty of Romania. In view of the nature of this action the 
leadership of the Romanian Communist party and the government 
of Romania vigorously protest to the leadership of the HSWP and the 
government of Hungary.  At the same time the Romanian side wishes 
to convey that the following: 
Romania withdraws the invitation for the visit of a Hungarian del-
egation to Romania.
The Romanian Ambassador to Hungary is recalled for consultations.58
The continuing propaganda war evidently contributed to a dark-
ened mood in Romania  and helped  reinforce reasons for not leaving 
the country, even illegally. This is why new regulations ostensibly is-
sued to protect Romanian borders, but actually to stem illegal border 
crossings, caused an outcry in public opinion, but also in the Bucha-
rest diplomatic corps.59 The state council of the Romanian Socialist Re-
public in the middle of July (official bulletin 26. 17. 07. 1989.) with a 
decree No.170/1989 issued regulations regarding the use of weapons, 
munitions and explosive material in the border areas. With additional 
decrees, the regime issued regulations modifying earlier border control 
operations and conditions governing the use of firearms. 
The Hungarian embassy’s reaction to the new regulations was that 
in comparison with previous regulations, it was clear that Romania be-
came even more stringent regarding restrictions in the border zones. 
By building the ’fences’, Romania increased its isolation from the out-
side world. By increasing the restrictions of freedom of movement and 
tightening up the rules of transit made more stringent an already over-
regulated border transit system affecting the resident population. The 
58 Fejti, György’s report to the members of the Operative Committee of Political Affairs 
about the negotiations with the Romanian ambassador.
59 The execution of the Cabinet Directive about the defence of the borders of Romania. 
Embassy of the People’s Republic of Hungary, Bucharest, 10 September 1989. Declassified 
documents of the Ministry of Foreign Affaris 1989. NAH XIX-J-1-j. 76. b. 171/Szt/89.
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new ones did not define border crime, but it stated that “if the sub-
ject persecuted in the zone has committed  a serious crime earlier and 
crossing the border would cause extraordinarily serious danger, fire-
arms can be used against them.” This, in the last resort, meant absolute 
freedom in the use of firearms. These measures only strengthened the 
probability of the rumors that the cruel Romanian police and army 
would want to commit murder to prevent the flight of refugees into 
Hungarian territory. Such stories were not alien to public opinion, and 
the press was especially fond of publishing alleged or actual stories like 
these, some of which elicited international interest. 
Instead of an Epilogue
The sources cited highlight the fact the complex problems associ-
ated with the migration process are truly a big challenge to both the 
Hungarian political leadership as well for all organizations, whether of 
the state or not, that participate in the execution of the relevant tasks. 
We can see today in the resolution of these tasks that changes in regula-
tory systems and institutional techniques, and perhaps even more the 
legal culture, are a little ahead of the changes in other areas of trans-
formation of the constitutional state. This, of course, is related to the 
fact that the effective and humane management of refugee affairs was 
adapted to the prevailing legal order in harmony with the international 
human rights norms. At the same time we should be mindful of the 
fact that when the prevailing political interest demanded it, then, and 
depending on the situation, the application of the (international) legal 
standards could be placed in brackets.
But the international influence did not prove to be one-sided; hence, 
the experience was also useful the other way around. The appearance 
of Romanian refugees in Hungary and the solution of their situation 
is almost a model tableau for the new migration wave that started in 
the 90’s, after the collapse of the communist system, already from 1988 
onward. Therefore, those experiences learned Hungarian solutions 
strongly contributed to the fact that the Western European countries 
received the migration wave in a relatively – though with delay – more 
prepared manner. Finally, in spite of the various mistakes and occa-
sional failures, the newly formed migration system answered unknown 






Ara-Kovács, A. (1999) “Mirage on the street corner.” Talker (“Beszélő”), 9.
Balázs, Á. (1989) “On Romanian village settlement.” Foreign Policy 2.
Baráth, M. (2008) Handling and eliminating docu ments. In: The Report of 
the Professional Commission 2007-2008. (manuscript) 
Borhi, L. 2007. “It is Hungary’s duty to remain in the Warsaw Treaty - interna-
tional connections of the changes in 1989 in the mirror of Hungarian 
sources.” Foreign Affairs, summer-autumn.
Bozóki, A. (1999) (ed.) The scenario of the change of the regime. Round table 
negotiations in 1989. Vol 3, Budapest: Magvető.
Ceausescu, N. (1970) “The Report of the Central Committee of the Roma-
nian Communist Party about the activities of RCP from the period 
between Congress 9 and 10 about the future tasks of the Party. 6th Au-
gust 1969.” In: Romania on the way of building a many-sided developed 
socialistic society. Bucharest: Polities.
Csapodi, T. (2002) “Mines in Hungary.” Fundamentum, 2.
Deák, P. (2007) 2 Conceptual and content wise approaches and new inter-
pretations of security. In: Deák, P. (ed.) Handbook of Security Policy. 
Budapest: Osiris. 
Forró, T. and Havas, H. (1988) Interview with captain Pénzes, Margit the act-
ing director of the Division of Administration of Hajdú-Bihar coun-
ty police department. In: After Arad - who knows where? Budapest: 
Background.
Harcsa, I. (1997) “Migration.” In: Kollega, T. A. (ed.) Hungary in the 20th cen-
tury II. Szekszárd: Babits.
Hegedűs, I. (2001) “Press and control in the end of the Kádár-era.” Media 
Research, 1.
Horvath, I. (2002) “The number of Romanians migrating to Hungary in a 
yearly compilation. The migration of the Hungarian minority in Ro-
mania to Hungary.” Our Times (“Korunk”). February. 
Hunya, G, (1989) “Urbanisation plans in the mirror of resolutions, declara-
tions and press publications.” Space and Society, 2.
Kádár, M. (1953) (ed.) Penal Code. Special part. Budapest: Eötvös Loránd 
University.
Kárpáti, F. (2000) “The Romaraian revolution and Hungary, 1989. The mem-
ories of en ex-minister.” History, 4.
Kende, P. (1989) “Romanian refugees in Hungary.” Foreign Policy, 2.
Köpeczi, B. (1986) (ed.) History of Transylvania I-III. Budapest: Academy.
Köpeczi, B. (2006) “The history of Transylvanian from a 30-year view.” Minor-
ity Issues, 1.
Lipcsey, I. (1989) “Four decades of Romanian ethnic policy.” Foreign Policy, 2.
Okváth, I. (1988) A bastion on the front of peace. Hungarian army and military 
policy, 1945-1956. Budapest: Aquila.
Oláh, S. (1998) “The means and institutions of practicing power in the Székely 
rural society of the 1950.” In: Our splendid yesterday. Miercurea Ciuc: 
Pro-Print.
47
Onward (“Előre”) Anon. (1984) In the light of the Resolutions of the Party 
Con gress 13 about the tasks of the Committee of Romanian Workers 
of Hungarian Nationality. 29th December 1984.
Our democratic police is five years old. Anon. 1950. Hungarian Policeman. 
15th January 1950. p . 4.
Penal Code of the Socialistic Republic of Romania: Official Text. Anon. Ed-
ited by the Panel of the Ministry of Justice and Public Prosecutor’s 
Office of the Socialistic Republic of Romania. Scholarly Publishing 
House, Bucharest, 1956.
Pór, E. (2004) “The press policy of the Kádár Regime 1963-1979.” In: Closed, 
discrete, numbered. 2. Literary, press and publication policy 1962-
1979. Budapest: Osiris.
Révész, B. (2005) “A NATO-document about the situation of the Hungar-
ian minority in Romania.” ArchivNet 1. (http://www.archivnet.hu / 
downloaded 14. 12. 2010.)
Révész, B. (2008) “Out of Romania!” Reasons and Methods as Reflected in 
State Security Documents 1987-1989. Budapest: Regio.
Ripp, Z. (2006) Change of the regime in Hungary 1987-1990. Budapest: 
Napvilág. 
Süle, A. R. (1990) “Political History of Romania 1944-1990.” In: Romania 
1944-1990. Economic and political history. Budapest: Atlantisz – 
Bear-dance (“Medvetánc”).
Süle, R. A. (1990) “Plans of the rearrangement of settlements and territories 
in Romania.” Region, 1.
Szántó, M, (1984)  Hungarians in the world. Budapest: Kossuth.
Tóth, J. (1991) “From political migration to migration policy.” Moving World 
(„Mozgó Világ”), 11. 
Tóth, J. (2008) When an emergency has come to stay. The birth of the refugee 
administration in 1988 –1989. Budapest: Regio.
Tóth, P. P. (1997) Is there only one home? Refugees, immigrants, new citizens in 
Hungary. (1988-1994). Budapest: Püski.
Tóth, P. P. (2001.) “Migration in Hungary in the 19 and 20th centuries.” In: Mi-
gration and the European Union. Social and Family Affairs, Budapest
Tóth, S. (1989) Introduction. In: Report from Transylvania. II. Paris Hungar-
ian Pamphlets 13. 
Tóth, S. (1989a) The plan of strategic breakthrough. In: Report from Transyl-
vania. II. Paris Hungarian Pamphlets 13.
Varga, C. (1998) (ed.) Heroes’ Square, 27th June 88. Eötvös, Budapest.
Vincze, G. (1994) Chronology of the Hungarian minority in Romania. Buda-
pest: László Teleki Foundation.
Béla Révész
Tensions Without Solutions
